Impact, regulation and health policy implications of physician migration in OECD countries by Forcier, Mélanie Bourassa et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Human Resources for Health
Open Access Research
Impact, regulation and health policy implications of physician 
migration in OECD countries
Mélanie Bourassa Forcier1, Steven Simoens*2 and Antonio Giuffrida3
Address: 1Patent Policy Directorate, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium 
and 3Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, USA
Email: Mélanie Bourassa Forcier - BourassaForcier.Melanie@ic.gc.ca; Steven Simoens* - steven.simoens@pharm.kuleuven.ac.be; 
Antonio Giuffrida - ANTONIOGI@iadb.org
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: In the face of rising demand for medical services due to ageing populations, physician
migration flows are increasingly affecting the supply of physicians in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and development (OECD) countries. This paper offers an integrated perspective on the
impact of physician migration on home and host countries and discusses international regulation
and policy approaches governing physician migration.
Methods:  Information about migration flows, international regulation and policies governing
physician migration were derived from two questionnaires sent to OECD countries, a secondary
analysis of EUROSTAT Labour Force Surveys, a literature review and official policy documents of
OECD countries.
Results: OECD countries increasingly perceive immigration of foreign physicians as a way of
sustaining their physician workforce. As a result, countries have entered into international
agreements regulating physician migration, although their success has been limited due to the
imposition of licensing requirements and the protection of vested interests by domestic physicians.
OECD countries have therefore adopted specific policies designed to stimulate the immigration of
foreign physicians, whilst minimising its negative impact on the home country. Measures promoting
immigration have included international recruitment campaigns, less strict immigration
requirements and arrangements that foster shared learning between health care systems. Policies
restricting the societal costs of physician emigration from developing countries such as good
practice guidelines and taxes on host countries have not yet produced their expected effect or in
some cases have not been established at all.
Conclusions: Although OECD countries generally favour long-term policies of national self-
sufficiency to sustain their physician workforce, such policies usually co-exist with short-term or
medium-term policies to attract foreign physicians. As this is likely to continue, there is a need to
create a global framework that enforces physician migration policies that confer benefits on home
and host countries. In the long term, OECD countries need to put in place appropriate education
and training policies rather than rely on physician migration to address their future needs.
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Background
Migration of physicians has become a prominent issue as
a result of the increasing globalisation of the physician
workforce. The establishment of regional labour markets
has provided a new legal framework governing the inter-
national movements of individuals. Such a framework
may foster the free movement of physicians, particularly
through the harmonisation and recognition of qualifica-
tions and diplomas across countries. Foreign physicians
also play an important role in compensating for an inad-
equate domestic supply in many countries of the OECD.
However, the increasing flows of physicians might gener-
ate unintended consequences. The permanent departure
of skilled labour might deplete the human capital of
home countries, thus reducing the possibility for eco-
nomic growth and raising the level of inequalities and
poverty in those countries. Moreover, increasing concerns
in host countries about the safety and quality of health
care provision by foreign physicians has created barriers to
migration and, in some cases, discrimination against for-
eign physicians.
This paper presents a comprehensive study of interna-
tional migration of physicians by documenting migration
flows in OECD countries and by analysing impact, regula-
tion, and health policy implications of physician migra-
tion. The empirical evidence on the contribution of
foreign physicians to the physician workforce of OECD
countries is briefly reviewed. A societal perspective is then
adopted to analyse the benefits and costs of physician
migration on home and host countries. International reg-
ulation governing physician migration and its impact on
migration flows are examined in the subsequent section.
Policies that OECD countries have implemented to attract
foreign physicians in order to sustain their domestic phy-
sician workforce are then evaluated. The final section dis-
cusses lessons learnt from experiences of OECD countries
with physician migration with a view to developing
approaches to physician migration that confer benefits on
home and host countries.
Methods
In order to investigate the complexity of international
migration of physicians, information was derived from a
variety of data sources [1]. The Secretariat sent a quantita-
tive questionnaire to national correspondents of partici-
pating OECD countries. This questionnaire elicited data
about the proportion of practising physicians who are for-
eign-trained and the number of physicians who move
abroad to attend postgraduate training or to practise. In
order to be able to judge the quality and comparability of
data across countries, national correspondents provided
details of the body responsible for collecting data, the
national source of information, the coverage and time
period of the data. Correspondents were also able to pro-
vide additional comments on data quality, if they so
wished. In addition to this, the Secretariat sent a qualita-
tive questionnaire to correspondents, which dealt with
issues relating to the impact of immigration and emigra-
tion on physician supply, the recognition of foreign-
trained physicians, and policies governing physician
migration.
Both questionnaires were designed by the Secretariat and
approved by national correspondents during an expert
meeting dedicated to the data collection exercise in April
2001. Questionnaires were sent to the 22 OECD countries
that expressed a wish to participate in the study during
autumn 2002, with 17 countries returning at least one of
the two questionnaires. These countries were Australia,
Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United
States (response rate of 77%). This was supplemented by
a secondary analysis of data on physician migration flows
from the EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey.
The Secretariat also carried out a desk review of the rele-
vant literature. The review was not systematic, but
designed to identify and learn from the experiences of
OECD countries with respect to the impact, regulation
and health policy implications of international migration
of physicians. The following electronic databases were
searched: MEDLINE, EMBASE, HealthSTAR, Social Sci-
ence Citation Index, Health Management Information
Consortium, and ECONLIT. Individual journals in this
field were searched and additional studies were collected
from the bibliographies of articles retrieved. National cor-
respondents and a number of experts in this area of
research were also contacted in an effort to access official
documents produced by OECD governments, unpub-
lished studies and conference reports. Statements made in
this article are based on the findings of the survey, unless
otherwise stated.
Results
Physician migration flows in OECD countries
Migration of physicians is increasingly affecting OECD
countries. Annual flows of physicians in and out of a
country are an important factor influencing domestic sup-
ply. In Canada, the net effect of immigration and emigra-
tion flows of physicians has generally been a net loss to
the Canadian physician workforce over the last two dec-
ades (see Figure 1). Foreign-trained physicians now make
a substantial contribution to the national supply of physi-
cians, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries where they
comprise more than 20% of the physician workforce in
2000 (see Figure 2). International migration of physicians
appears to be driven by a number of 'pull' factors such asHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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opportunities for professional training, offers of higher
wages, and better employment opportunities in the host
country. 'Push' factors such as less attractive pay and work-
ing conditions, high unemployment rates, political insta-
bility and insecurity in the home country also play a role
[1].
Physicians move abroad for training purposes, either to
obtain a medical degree, to acquire additional profes-
sional qualifications or to gain experience with medical
techniques. Immigration for training purposes can
account for a substantial number of foreign-trained physi-
cians in a country. Overseas physicians who were attend-
ing postgraduate training in England made up 39.6% of
all overseas physicians in the National Health Service in
1995, 36.2% in 2000 and 37.3% in 2001. International
medical graduates who came to the United States to
attend postgraduate training comprised 11.9% of all inter-
national medical graduates in 1980, 12.1% in 1990,
15.1% in 1995 and 13.1% in 2000. Similarly, training
opportunities may account for a significant proportion of
emigrating physicians. In 2001, the number of physicians
who were registered in Switzerland, but were living
abroad to attend postgraduate training and to practise was
555 and 629, respectively.
Table 1 reports the composition of the foreign(-trained)
physician workforce of selected OECD countries. These
data show that developing countries are just one, but not
necessarily the main source of international recruitment
of physicians by OECD countries: a large contribution to
the foreign physician workforce of Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Nor-
way and Switzerland originated from another European
country. Although a large proportion of foreign(-trained)
physicians in the United Kingdom and the United States
Emigration and immigration flows in the Canadian medical workforce, 1980–2000 Figure 1
Emigration and immigration flows in the Canadian medical workforce, 1980–2000. [Source: OECD Human 
Resources for Health Care project.]
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originate from India, this country is actively pursuing a
policy to export physicians.
Additionally, Table 1 illustrates that flows of physicians
between OECD countries are not always unidirectional.
Countries showing a high number of physicians' emigra-
tion also present a significant inflow of foreign-trained
physicians, who usually end up in posts that nationals are
reluctant to take. For instance, during the 1990s, around
1% of the Canadian stock of active physicians left the
country each year, the majority to the United States. On
the other hand, we note that nowadays around 25% of
Canada's practicing physicians are foreign-trained. The
major source of foreign-trained physicians was the UK,
followed by South Africa and India. In particular Alberta
and Saskatchewan have been actively recruiting primary
care physicians from South Africa to fill practices located
in remote areas. This is sometimes referred to as a 'carou-
sel movement' [2].
The direction of migration flows may also change over
time. For instance, in the 1960s many physicians working
in developing countries originated from developed coun-
tries, but in the 1990s developing countries were esti-
mated to supply 56% of all migrating physicians and
receive less than 11% [3].
Language affects migration flows in that physicians are
more likely to move between countries speaking the same
language. Amongst OECD countries, this is mirrored in
the incidence and extent of migration flows between Aus-
tralia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the
Percentage of practising physicians who are foreign-trained, 2000 Figure 2
Percentage of practising physicians who are foreign-trained, 2000. [Source: OECD Human Resources for Health 
Care project. Notes: Data for England relate to physicians in the National Health Service. Data for New Zealand refer to for-
eign-trained practicing physicians.]
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Table 1: Supply of foreign(-trained) physicians in selected OECD member countries
Australia (1998): 21.4% of foreign-trained physicians, of those: Austria (2001): 3.3% of foreign physicians, of those:
United Kingdom 39.0% Germany 84.3%
Asia 28.0% Italy 7.3%
New Zealand 12%
Other countries 21%
Belgium (2001): 7.8% of foreign physicians, of those: Canada (1998): 20% of foreign-trained physicians, of those:
Netherlands 28.0% United Kingdom 32%
Italy 17.7% South Africa 9.7%
United Kingdom 16.5% India 9.6%
France 16.4% Eastern Europe 8.5%
Slovak Republic 12.4% Western Europe 8.2%
Africa 9.0%
Denmark (2001): 7.8% of foreign physicians, of those: France (2000): 2.2% of foreign physicians, of those:
Norway 50.0% Europe 49.0%
Spain 24.7% North-Africa 33.0%
Germany 20.1% Sub-Saharan Africa 7.0%
United States 5.2% Middle East 5.0%
Germany (2000): 3.5% of foreign physicians, of those: Ireland (2001): 13.1% of foreign physicians, of those:
EU countries 27.5% United Kingdom 29.2% France 3.2%
Other European countries 37% EU countries 13.6% Italy 3.2%
Non-European countries 35.5% Germany 6.0% Canada 3.1%
Australia 4.2% Central and Eastern Europe 3.1%
United States 3.4% Others 31.2%
Norway (2001): 11.2% of foreign physicians, of those: Switzerland (2001): 19.1% of foreign physicians, of those:
Germany 32.7% United Kingdom 6.2% Germany 59.7% Italy 4.8%
Sweden 19.9% Iceland 6.1% Yugoslavia 13.1% Albania 4.0%
Denmark 15.8% Finland 5.3% Belgium 7.4% Spain 3.2%
Central and Eastern Europe 11.5% Netherlands 2.4% Sweden 4.9% Argentina 2.9%
United Kingdom (2001): 12.6% of foreign physicians, of those: United States (2001): 27% of foreign-trained physicians, of those:
India 18.3% South America 2.4% India 19.5%
Ireland 15.2% Ukraine 1.7% Pakistan 11.9%
South Africa 7.0% Poland 1.6% Philippines 8.8%
Other Africa 7.0% Australia 1.6% Ex-U.S.S.R. 3.1%
South and South-Eastern Asia 7.0% Belgium 1.6% Egypt 2.6%
Northern Africa 5.3% China 1.6% Dominican Republic 2.5%
Greece 4.7% Denmark 1.5% Syria 2.5%
Pakistan 4.4% France 1.5% United Kingdom 2.4%
Germany 4.0% Western Asia 1.5% Germany 2.3%
Algeria 3.6% Italy 1.4% Mexico 1.8%
Iraq 3.1% Bosnia Herzegovina 1.4%
Spain 2.6%
Sources: EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey, [17-21].Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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United States; between Austria, Germany and Switzer-
land; between Belgium and France; and between Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (see Table 1).
Historical, administrative and legislative frameworks,
training institutions, professional associations and regula-
tion have influenced practices in former colonies and
affected the migration of physicians for training and
employment opportunities. This explains the significant
migration flows of physicians from India towards Aus-
tralia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States
and from North African and Middle Eastern countries to
France (see Table 1).
Impact of physician migration
Migration of physicians is not necessarily beneficial from
a social point of view. In making the decision to move, the
potential migrant takes into account the private costs and
benefits of the move. However, migration also produces
externalities that influence the welfare of people in both
the home and host country.
Consequences for the home country
In assessing the impact of physician migration on health
care provision in the home country, it is crucial to con-
sider the issues of physician supply and the duration of
migration.
A number of countries such as Cuba, India and the Phil-
ippines systematically train more physicians than they
need and send them abroad to benefit from remittances.
Remittances, the money that migrants earn working
abroad and send back to their home country, can be a cru-
cial source of foreign exchange and aid the long-term
development of the home country. For instance, a study
focusing on physicians from the Philippines who practise
overseas estimated that remittances were large enough to
compensate for the economic losses associated with emi-
gration [4]. The impact of emigration on health care pro-
vision in the home country is limited, as these countries
have an adequate supply of physicians.
However, many host countries are developing countries
that face physician shortages themselves. In this case, emi-
gration represents a brain drain from home countries and
is likely to lead to a deterioration in the working condi-
tions of remaining physicians. Moreover, it may affect
access to and quality of care, and impair the ability of the
health care system to achieve health objectives for its pop-
ulation [1]. Migration may also influence the capacity of
the home country to provide quality training to new phy-
sicians and the research capacity of medical schools. For
instance, in Nigeria and other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, most medical research institutions have collapsed
from the massive emigration flows of highly-skilled phy-
sicians [5].
It is also important to distinguish between permanent and
temporary migration. Whereas temporary migration of
physicians may produce benefits through an upgrading of
skills, technological and financial transfers, permanent
migration represents a net transfer of human capital from
the home to the host country. In the case of permanent
migration, the home country incurs two types of costs: the
first corresponds to resources spent to educate a physician;
and the second represents the value of the health care serv-
ices that the emigrating physician would have rendered to
his/her country in the absence of migration. Permanent
migration might improve the prospects of individual phy-
sicians, but substantial and lasting emigration flows may
weaken the capacity of the home country's health care sys-
tem. These consequences are most important in the poor-
est countries that are not able to attract substitutes from
other countries.
Temporary migration may be inspired by the desire to
acquire higher professional qualifications or to gain expe-
rience with new techniques not available in the home
country. If the host country subsidises the education of
foreign students and these migrants return to their home
country after they graduate, temporary migration of phy-
sicians can contribute to a general upgrading of skills in
the home country. Yet there may be certain limits to this.
If the skills that migrants have acquired during their stay
abroad are too specialised, the home country may not be
in a position to take advantage of them.
Consequences for the host country
In OECD countries, foreign physicians are predominantly
used as a supplement to local labour. This is because for-
eign physicians are more willing to practise in certain
organisational settings and in certain geographical areas
that domestic physicians tend to avoid. This is sometimes
referred to as the 'safety-net' role. In the United Kingdom,
general practitioners who graduated in South Asian med-
ical schools (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka)
are concentrated in less attractive areas with large patient
lists and relatively deprived populations [6]. In the United
States, international medical graduates contribute signifi-
cantly to care in rural areas [7]. However, in Canada, pol-
icies requiring foreign physicians to practise in pre-
specified areas have been legally challenged as a violation
of basic human rights and have been judged against the
Canadian Charter of Human Rights [8].
Increased supply in the host country might bring benefits
to consumers. Consumers may benefit from improved
access to care and may gain from reduced medical care
prices. Estimates of the gain to consumers from immigra-Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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tion in the United States, measured as a percentage of total
expenditures on physician services, ranged from near 1%
in 1966 to over 12% by 1971 [9]. Increased competition
between physicians may raise the quality of health care
services provided in the host country. On the other hand,
immigration may endanger the safety and quality of
health care provision if the physicians concerned have a
lower standard of medical practice. Concerns that qualifi-
cations are not equivalent across countries and differences
in practice patterns have been used by professional associ-
ations to exclude foreign physicians [10].
International regulation governing physician migration
Although OECD countries generally favour long-term
policies of national self-sufficiency to sustain their physi-
cian workforce, such policies usually co-exist with short-
term or medium-term policies to attract physicians from
abroad, on a temporary or permanent basis. Immigration
of physicians is considered to be important in maintain-
ing an adequate supply of physicians in countries such as
Australia, Canada, England, Germany, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Con-
versely, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden perceived
physician emigration to negatively affect the supply of
physicians in their country.
As a result, OECD countries have entered into interna-
tional agreements regulating physician migration by
imposing general requirements that physicians have to
fulfil in order to move and work abroad. These provisions
refer to, amongst other things, nationality and citizenship
requirements, national regulation governing the issuance
of work permits, procedures and tests for examining asy-
lum applications. One of the agreements that covers the
temporary immigration of physicians into an OECD
country is the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).
If a WTO member decides to make a commitment to the
sector of health services, the country must specify whether
and to what extent market access and national treatment
are granted. If a WTO member grants full market access,
the country must refrain from operating any of six types of
restrictions enumerated in Article XVI of the agreement.
These are mostly quota-related barriers that may limit, for
example, the number of service providers (hospitals, phy-
sicians, etc.) or operations (number of beds, practices,
etc.). Also precluded under this Article is the use of eco-
nomic need tests, e.g. the conditioning of access approvals
on pre-established indicators such as the number of hos-
pital beds or practices per head of population. Members
may also provide some, but limited market access, i.e.
they may maintain any of the six types of restrictions pro-
vided they list them in their schedule of commitments.
Article XVII defines national treatment as the absence of
any measures that modify the conditions of competition
to the detriment of foreign services or service suppliers.
Again, however, Members are free to make no commit-
ment on national treatment, or to provide partial national
treatment provided they list the measures they maintain
which discriminate in favour of nationals in their
schedule.
For the health services sector, commitments under GATS
can be made separately for four modes of supply: (a)
cross-border trade (e.g. telemedicine); (b) consumption
abroad (e.g. a patient travels to another country for health
treatment); (c) commercial presence (e.g. a foreign hospi-
tal establishes in another country); and (d) temporary
movement of service suppliers (e.g. a physician working
temporarily in another country). Commitments can also
be made for a mode of supply across all service sectors (a
so-called "horizontal commitment"). Although most
countries' commitments on movement of service suppli-
ers are horizontal, they tend to be very limited, due to sen-
sitivities over the potential impact of temporary foreign
workers and the desire of countries to retain full flexibility
in their temporary migration regimes.
GATS seems to have had a limited impact so far on the
migration of physicians. Very few commitments have
been made for trade in health services: only 29 countries
have made commitments for health services, and then
only partial commitments for some health services
[11,12]. Commitments to the movement of physicians are
also very limited. For instance, as a result of commitments
under the GATS, temporary resident visas are available in
Australia only for suitably qualified physicians who satisfy
labour market requirements (i.e. provide services to rural
and remote communities).
Moreover, within the GATS framework, Members are free
to pursue domestic policies in areas such as technical
standards, licensing and qualifications to ensure the safety
and quality of health care provision. That implies that a
commitment to allow entry of foreign physicians is still
subject to those physicians meeting all domestic regula-
tory requirements to practise. GATS states only that such
requirements must be transparent (i.e. made publicly
available) and must be administered in a reasonable,
objective and impartial manner.
International agreements stimulating the immigration of
foreign physicians have been accompanied by require-
ments licensing medical practice in a country to ensure
the quality and safety of services provided by migrants.
However, licensing provisions may also serve to reduce
competition in the host country and to raise the income
of domestic physicians. This raises the issue of how for-
eign physicians are mobilised within the health care sys-Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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tem of the host country and the conditions under which
they have to work. In some cases, this has lead to a situa-
tion where physicians whose qualifications have not been
recognised by the host country still practise medicine even
though their status is unclear. In other cases, specialists
work as generalists or generalists work as nurses. Once reg-
istered, physicians may also face discriminatory employ-
ment practices. A survey showed that 9% of foreign
physicians claim discriminatory practices in finding
employment in the United Kingdom [13].
Licensing requirements usually consist of holding the
required qualifications (i.e. medical degree) from a recog-
nised medical school and of having completed a period of
training. However, the license is only valid within the
jurisdiction of the granting body. This is usually an entire
country, but in some cases a province or state, as in Can-
ada and the United States. This implies that physicians
who wish to practise in another country have to go
through the process of having their qualifications recog-
nised by the relevant body in the host country. In Aus-
tralia, physicians who are seeking permanent residency
are required to pass an examination administered by the
Australian Medical Council. This examination is set at the
standard of medical knowledge, clinical skills and atti-
tudes required of newly qualified graduates from Austral-
ian medical schools. In Canada, international physicians
must take the Medical Council of Canada Evaluating
Examination and must fulfil registration requirements of
licensing bodies. In order to practise in the United States,
physicians trained abroad must pass a clinical skills
assessment exam. In addition, they must complete gradu-
ate training in most cases.
Simplified procedures exist for physicians trained in spe-
cific countries. For instance, from 1 May 2002, graduates
of British medical schools recognised by the General Med-
ical Council are eligible for permanent registration in New
Zealand without having to sit the New Zealand Medical
Council registration examination. There is also a Mutual
Recognition Agreement between Australia and New Zea-
land, providing for automatic recognition of primary
medical qualifications conferred by all medical schools
within these jurisdictions. Licensing provisions governing
the migration of Canadian physicians to the United States
have been simplified in that fewer visa restrictions apply
and Canadian physicians do not have to pass the Clinical
Skills Assessment exams.
The European Union has adopted a range of measures to
simplify licensing provisions. The European Union gener-
ally provides for a broad right to labour mobility. The
Treaty of Rome (enforced in 1957 and subsequently
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997) gives every
European Union citizen a fundamental, personal right to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States. No visas or work permits are required, although
residence permits may be. In addition to this, Member
States have adopted sectoral directives that facilitate the
movement of physicians through the harmonisation and
recognition of qualifications and diplomas. In the context
of physician migration, the most relevant directives are
the so-called "doctors' directives" (75/362/EEC and 75/
363/EEC). These directives entitle any European Union
physician who has completed basic training in a Member
State and who holds a recognised qualification to be auto-
matically registered in any other Member State. To this
effect, the doctors' directives have established minimum
standards with respect to the nature, minimum content
and length of education and training programmes.
The sectoral directives are based on the principle of
mutual confidence and comparability of training levels.
This is reflected in the "Recognition of Foreign Profes-
sional Qualifications Act", which requires European
Union Member States to consider the practical experience
of an individual in the process of recognition of qualifica-
tions. In case of structural differences in education and
training programmes between countries, Member States
are entitled to require an adaptation period and an apti-
tude test, which imposes an additional barrier on the
migration of physicians.
The impact of the European Union doctors' directives on
the movement of physicians has been minimal, except in
some isolated cases. For instance, since the adoption of
the directives in 1977, there has been an increase in the
number of physicians emigrating to the United Kingdom
from other Member States, although these numbers have
reached a ceiling in more recent years.
The limited impact of the European Union doctors' direc-
tives is linked to the general absence of physician sur-
pluses in other Member States (which restricts the pool of
potential migrants), failure to implement the directives
and recognise the equivalence of qualifications by some
Member States.
In addition, there have been reports that some profes-
sional associations refuse to register physicians from cer-
tain Member States who comply with European Union
minimum qualification standards [10]. To justify such
practices, professional associations claim variations in
qualifications that might occur because of differences in
the number of patient contacts or in practical experience.
This might be linked both to the educational and cultural
system of the migrant. In this regard, we note that flows
are more intense among countries with similar health care
systems.Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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Furthermore, despite the presence of provisions allowing
Member States to request information regarding the good
character, reputation or the criminal past of an individual,
many Member States are concerned about the immigra-
tion of physicians who have had dubious medical prac-
tices in the past. Such concerns are motivated by the fact
that some Member States have difficulty in keeping relia-
ble data on physicians. In fact, cases have been reported of
physicians who lost their licence to practise in one country
for misconduct who were subsequently authorised to
practise in another European Union country.
Health policy implications of physician migration
Given the limited success of international agreements reg-
ulating physician migration, OECD countries have
adopted specific policies designed to stimulate the immi-
gration of foreign physicians, whilst minimising its nega-
tive impact on the home country. OECD countries have
generally adopted three types of policies to attract foreign
physicians. These have consisted of launching interna-
tional recruitment campaigns, easing immigration
requirements and setting up special arrangements that
foster shared learning between health care systems. Inter-
national recruitment campaigns have involved advertise-
ments in the medical press and participation in job fairs
in Germany and language courses in Norway.
Some OECD countries have eased general immigration
requirements for physicians. In Canada, changes to the
Immigration Act Regulation favour the immigration of
physicians and increased efforts are being made to sup-
port licensure of foreign-trained physicians. Australia and
the United States have made the relaxation of immigra-
tion requirements conditional on foreign physicians prac-
tising in rural areas. In Ireland, the option exists to fast
track working visas for foreign physicians.
In addition to the two previous types of policies stimulat-
ing physician immigration, the United Kingdom has put
in place arrangements that foster international co-opera-
tion and promote the National Health Service abroad. An
International Fellowship Programme was launched in
2002 to attract experienced specialists from abroad to
selected posts in the National Health Service for periods of
one to two years. It targets those specialities that need to
grow in order to fulfil the National Health Service plan
and those specialities with perceived shortages such as car-
dio-thoracic surgery, histopathology, radiology, nuclear
medicine and psychiatry.
However, concerns about ethical recruitment have led
some OECD countries to discourage recruitment from
developing countries. In May 2003, Commonwealth
countries adopted an International Code of Practice for
the International Recruitment of Health Workers. The
code of practice is intended to discourage physician
recruitment from countries that are themselves experienc-
ing shortages. Moreover, it sets out a number of principles
that guide international recruitment. Transparency of
recruitment would normally involve an agreement
between host and home countries. Fairness implies that
host countries would not seek to recruit physicians who
have an outstanding obligation to the home country and
would inform migrants of their rights and job require-
ments. Finally, international recruitment of physicians
would be based on mutuality of benefits to host and
home countries.
Given that the temporary outflow of physicians from
developing countries may be beneficial in terms of invest-
ment in skills, a second type of policy has focused on
offering grants to foreign students to enter medical school,
while at the same time making it impossible for foreign
graduates to obtain a work permit for a certain amount of
time (e.g. five years). This, in effect, forces them to return
to their home country after they graduate. Some OECD
countries have created regulations or have entered into
bilateral agreements restricting the stay of foreign physi-
cians. For instance, the United States has created a 'cul-
tural exchange visa' that can be issued to foreign health
care workers only for a limited duration of work. After the
permitted stay, the visitor is required to return home for a
two-year period before he is entitled to apply for re-admit-
tance.
A third approach has consisted of financially compensat-
ing the developing country for losses in terms of costs of
education and training and the value of the health care
services that could have been provided if the physician
had not left the country. The reimbursement of educa-
tional costs is in fact proposed by the International Code
of Practice approved by Commonwealth countries. How-
ever, the problem with such policies is the difficulty in
evaluating the country's net loss (subtracting direct and
indirect costs created by the departure of the physicians
from migration gains, such as an increase in scientific
knowledge and remittances). In addition, the potential
return of the physician might represent a problem in set-
ting the level of compensation. Such difficulties may
explain the fact that previous schemes attempting to tax
host countries, and even migrants, have not proven to be
successful [14].
Few OECD countries appear to have implemented poli-
cies to reduce the level of emigration of physicians and
little is known about the effectiveness of existing pro-
grammes. New Zealand has undertaken efforts to main-
tain contact with expatriate physicians, encouraging their
overseas development while offering some incentives for
their return. In Ontario, Canada, a repatriation pro-Human Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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gramme was introduced for Canadians who had under-
taken a postgraduate training programme in the United
States.
Discussion
This paper has examined the impact of physician migra-
tion on home and host countries, and focused on interna-
tional regulation and policy approaches governing
physician migration. When formulating policy recom-
mendations, it is helpful to first consider the determinants
of international migration of physicians.
On the one hand, physician immigration to OECD coun-
tries is driven by a number of 'pull' factors such as oppor-
tunities for professional training, higher wages, and better
employment opportunities in the host country. This takes
place within the overall context of OECD countries
actively promoting international recruitment as a way of
sustaining their domestic physician workforce. Therefore,
many OECD countries have entered into international
and regional agreements easing border controls in order
to facilitate the movement of physicians across countries.
However, the success of these legal changes remains lim-
ited due to practical barriers relating to qualification and
licensing requirements. Alternative policies that ease
immigration requirements, launch international recruit-
ment campaigns and set up special arrangements that fos-
ter shared learning between health care systems appear to
have been more successful in increasing the flow of physi-
cians into host countries. However, in many of these
countries, there are still remnants of traditional hostility
towards foreign-trained physicians, especially within the
domestic medical profession, as foreign-trained physi-
cians may not reach the quality standards of the host
country and may infringe vested interests of the domestic
physician workforce.
On the other hand, a number of 'push' factors such as less
attractive pay and working conditions, high unemploy-
ment rates, political instability and insecurity in the home
country play a role in encouraging emigration of physi-
cians [1]. Therefore, even though it is reasonable for home
countries to argue that they can't compete with for
example higher pay and more attractive training and
working conditions offered to physicians in host coun-
tries, home countries still need to recognise that they
themselves have a role to play in developing strategies that
attract and retain physicians [2].
These driving forces of international migration of physi-
cians suggest that migration is likely to continue. There-
fore, one needs to focus on how the process of
international migration of physicians can be managed
and regulated in ways that confer benefits on both home
and host countries.
Home countries need to face the reality of increasing glo-
balisation of the physician workforce and the freedom of
individual physicians to move. In addition, physician
migration may produce benefits through remittances and
an upgrading of skills upon return of the physician to the
home country. To balance concerns about brain drain,
home countries can attract and retain physicians by
reforming their education system, improving pay and
working conditions, and implementing strategies that
encourage physicians to return to their home country.
South Africa, for example, has tried to sustain and increase
domestic physician supply by shortening the educational
curriculum; by making medical training more responsive
to the needs of the South-African population and the real-
ity of clinical practice in South Africa; by requiring physi-
cians to serve in mostly rural areas for one year upon
graduation; and by offering housing, social advantages,
improved pay and security to physicians working in the
public health sector [15]. It is also important to create
incentives for physicians to return to their home country
by guaranteeing employment that takes account of the
experience and competences that the physician acquired
abroad [5].
Host countries need to reconcile their desire to attract for-
eign(-trained) physicians with the need to adhere to prin-
ciples of good practice in international recruitment.
However, to date, codes of practice on ethical recruitment
have not yet produced their expected effect, given that
such codes are not legally binding; do not exclude recruit-
ment of physicians from identified countries, but only for-
bid recruitment campaigns in such countries; and apply to
a limited number of countries [15]. Therefore, countries
need to develop and strengthen codes of good practice on
international migration of physicians on a global scale.
Current bilateral agreements and agreements developed
as part of regional world areas need to be co-ordinated as
to ensure consistency and improve opportunities both for
home and host countries. Identifying countries that have
a surplus of physicians and putting in place an interna-
tional framework that creates and enforces ethical policies
governing the international recruitment of physicians
need to be explored. Such a framework must exclude
recruitment from countries in which emigration could
harm local health service provision and include policies
that promote temporary migration.
It has also been suggested that host countries compensate
home countries for the cost of educating and training phy-
sicians and the value of health care services that would
have been provided if the physician had not emigrated. To
date, the implementation of such policies has been ham-
pered by difficulties in quantifying the home country's net
loss associated with physician emigration. Therefore,
work that the WHO is currently carrying out on this issueHuman Resources for Health 2004, 2:12 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/12
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needs to be applauded and may provide an avenue for
considering such compensation schemes [1]. Such com-
pensation schemes may enable home countries to train a
sufficient number of physicians to compensate for physi-
cian emigration and to sustain the domestic workforce.
Alternatively, host countries can aid developing countries
in sustaining domestic supply of physicians by strength-
ening development aid policies [15]. Host countries, for
instance, can provide grants to foreign students to enter
medical school in the host country; set up projects of
shared learning with home countries; support the transfer
of medical technology to home countries; and encourage
physicians from host countries to spend a sabbatical year
abroad.
Finally, in the context of growing physician shortages in
many OECD countries, it can be argued that migration
flows can only offer temporary solutions and act as a
short-term buffer. Instead, countries need to focus on how
they can create an adequate supply by implementing pol-
icies affecting education and training, levels and methods
of remuneration, retention and retirement of domestic
physicians [16].
Conclusions
The experience of OECD countries with respect to the
impact, regulation and policy approaches to international
migration of physicians suggests that physician move-
ment between countries may confer benefits to both
home and host countries in specific cases. Many OECD
countries are sustaining their physician workforce by facil-
itating international recruitment of physicians. Tempo-
rary migration may produce benefits in the home country
through remittances and an upgrading of skills. However,
international migration of physicians may put pressure on
the health care system of a few countries that are net
exporters. Additionally, moves to recruit physicians from
developing countries need to be balanced by concerns
about a brain-drain in the home country. Further work is
needed to devise mechanisms that reconcile the freedom
of individual physicians to migrate with societal interests
of home and host countries to develop a health care sys-
tem that meets the health needs of the population.
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